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1. Introduction 
Intellectual property rights that are global and valid in several countries and continents are 
relatively new to the world. Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (from now 
on “TRIPS”) is the largest global attempt ever, and has received a lot of criticism from Non-
Government Organizations (from now on “NGOs”) and developing countries. TRIPS is an 
agreement signed by the 159 members of the World Trade Organization (from now on 
“WTO”) reached in negotiation of the 1995 Uruguay round, which regulates intellectual 
property protection. That TRIPS encompasses patentability of medicines, biological resources 
and life forms among other things has been critiqued for resulting in large social costs. 
Unaffordable essential medicines for the poor are one example of conflicting social costs and 
economic benefits: the social benefit of curing the ill is confronted with the need of 
pharmaceutical companies to regain funds spent on R&D (Khor, 2002). 
This thesis will deal with an adjacent subject to the much covered subject of economic 
growth, namely patents, innovation and development. More specifically medical patents and 
how the strengthening of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) have come to influence prices 
and availability of medicines, as well as public health, in developing countries. As such it can 
be said that this paper will mainly rely on two literatures in a quest to answer the research 
question: literature and studies on the effects of patents and literature covering the effects of 
TRIPS on prices and availability of medicines. The strand of literature that covers patent 
effects on innovation and growth is widely diverse in its theories and findings. Although 
innovation can be found as a key component in both older and newer models, there are 
differing opinions on how to best foster and encourage it. Critics of patents lean against 
models such as Justin Lin’s “Flying geese”-model in arguing that imitation is key to the 
achieving of economic growth and development in developing countries. Others like Thurow 
(1997) argue that an unrestricted access to the innovations of others would deter from 
innovation. The nature of knowledge makes it a public, unrivalrous, good which by definition 
carries market failures of failing to provide such goods. To ensure that there are incentives to 
invest and engage in innovation patents have been developed, which allow innovators to 
charge above the marginal cost of production and thereby profit from their inventions. 
(Thurow, 1997) 
This thesis aims at investigating the impact of pharmaceutical patents on price, availability of 
medicines and overall effects on public health by looking at the impact of TRIPS on India, 
Thailand, South Africa and Brazil. No such complete study considering several parallel cases 
when looking at medicine prices, availability and public health has been conducted 
previously, and as such it is hoped that this effort should shed additional light on the merits 
and demerits of TRIPS. Previous studies have often focused on just one country or one effect 
for a shorter period of time, thereby not giving much of a comprehensive overview of overall 
effects. The focus also differs from many other studies on patent effects which consider the 
needs of major companies in terms of protection to motivate and spur innovation (Mazzoleni, 
Nelson, 1998). 
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1.1 Aim and justification 
There is a large ongoing debate on the merits and costs of stricter implementation of global 
IPR, especially in connection to developing countries of the world. Supporters of stricter IPR 
are of the opinion that IPR don’t primarily serve developed countries and large corporations, 
but are instead of great benefit to small inventors and society as a means of information 
sharing. Opponents of IPR argue the social costs arising in developing countries as greater 
than patent holders’ economic benefit, meaning a need for restrictions on patentable items and 
maximum patent term duration (McDonald, 2002). In this paper the heated debate of IPR is 
brought to its edge by considering medicines, which is a central example of a large number of 
patents and arguably large social costs. By investigating changes in medicine price, 
availability and public health after the strengthening of IPR through TRIPS this paper aims to 
investigate some of the effects of TRIPS. In achieving its aim and answering the research 
questions this paper will encompass a brief section on the history of patents, as well as some 
explanatory sections on key concepts and organizations such as TRIPS, the WTO, essential 
medicines and The World Health Organization (WHO). The thesis will make use of four case 
studies on the countries India, Thailand, South Africa and Brazil.  
Question 1: 
How has TRIPS affected the price levels of medicines in the chosen case studies? 
Question 2:  
How has TRIPS affected the access to essential medicines in the chosen case studies? 
Question 3:  
To what extent is the implementation of IPR agreements such as TRIPS likely to have 
affected public health according to economic theory in the chosen case studies?  
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2. Background 
2.1 History of patents 
In some European countries the practice of issuing patents date back to the 14
th
 century. 
Historically patents have been offered as an incentive for inventing, a possibility 
predominantly available in industrialised and developed countries, and less so in developing 
countries. This can be understood through considering the potential benefits which a nation 
stands to gain from granting patents. The inventor and the nation may use patents to gain 
cutting edge by preventing others from using the invention (Moser, 2013). However, 
developing countries haven’t always respected patents. Just as innovation is perceived as 
integral in staying at the technology frontier, so is imitation seen as a means for developing 
countries to approach the technology frontier and thereby improve economic growth and 
development. There are many historical examples of international patent disputes spanning 
from 19
th
 century piracy of British literary works in the US to modern pirated Harry Potter-
novels in China. Practices of patent infringement and piracy are not limited to literary works, 
but counterfeit medicines have also been notorious. Developing countries’ interest in 
respecting patents has historically tended to increase as they begin to develop technologies 
and inventions worth patenting. Another reason for developing countries to strengthen their 
IPR has been after international pressure from developed countries (Mihm, 2007). Attempts to 
capture the pattern of innovation and imitation have been made, such as in “the Flying geese 
model” proposed by Justin Lin, chief economist of the World Bank. Lin (2011) argues that 
economic development, defined as a continuous industrial and technological upgrading, is 
achievable by all countries pursuing their comparative advantage and emulating the successful 
processes of others by benefitting from a so-called latecomer advantage. This process is often 
referred to as “the Flying geese”-model, due to the development pattern of countries 
resembling the shape of flying geese. The majority of developed countries have developed by 
using government intervention and market mechanisms to replicate the techniques and growth 
strategies used by others. This captures the reason behind the reluctance of developing 
countries to implement strict IPR in early stages of development as this hinders them from 
drawing advantage of the latecomer advantage as a means of pursuing growth and 
development (Lin, 2011). 
Patent agreements like TRIPS that are valid in several countries across multiple continents are 
relatively new to the world. This is especially true for patents on medicines, a commodity 
which several, both developed and developing, countries have purposely neglected to include 
in patent laws until recently. Examples of developed countries include Finland which began to 
permit medical patents in 1995, Italy in 1978 and Japan in 1976 (Jain, 2013). This shows that 
changes in patent laws are still continuous. Recent demands for increased patentability have 
for instance come from software and biotech companies (Mazzoleni, Nelson, 1998). As new 
fields of inventions have arisen and gained ground in world markets, together with increased 
global trade, the need for patents have increased, thereby driving changes in patent law. Not 
only has the point in time at which patent laws were introduced varied over time and among 
countries, but also the duration of patents. This makes it apparent that the relatively uniform 
modern patent laws enforced by the WTO are a new phenomenon (Moser, 2013). 
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Modern patents are usually valid 20 years. Patents can either be filed domestically, regionally 
or internationally, depending on the type of innovation and what is deemed most suitable. The 
cost for filing will vary depending on where the patent is filed; domestic patents are often 
cheaper than an international patent that applies in all member countries of the WTO. For a 
patent to be granted it is usually required for the invention to be non-obvious, of use and new 
(de Laat, 2005). This is more precisely put in Article 27 of the TRIPS-agreement which states 
that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields 
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application”. While the patent is valid the invention described is protected from 
copying or usage by others than the patent holder or any licensees. For medicines, this 
translates to mean prevention of produced (cheaper) generic brands (World Trade 
Organization, 1995). In the application for a patent the invention needs to be specified and 
described. There are primarily two reasons for this: to avoid confusion in the event of patent 
conflicts and to ensure that the underlying knowledge becomes publicly available. The patent 
holder’s temporary monopoly is in theory compensated for by making the knowledge 
publically available once the patent expires, thereby ensuring that the knowledge befalls 
society. This can for instance mean facilitating the production of generic medicines since the 
patented medicine has been fully disclosed in the patent and is thereby easy to replicate once 
the patent on the chemical compound expires. (de Laat, 2005).  
The need for patents within the pharmaceutical industry has been argued as especially great 
by economists such as Kingston (2001). As the intellectual property of medicines can be 
captured in a formula and the formula takes comparatively little effort to unveil once the 
product has been released to the market, it is hard to protect by mere secrecy. The barriers for 
imitation are fairly low, and if the medicine proves useful in treatment, then the potential 
profits are large. The large amount of funding required for reaching a final product made clear 
that patents were required in order for companies to regain their investments in R&D 
(Kingston, 2001). Patenting of medicines usually occurs when the chemical and possibly 
valuable compounds have been synthesized, applications have been discovered and the 
processes for manufacturing have been developed. Studies have shown that about 80 percent 
of all pharmaceutical products and 43 percent of all processes are patented. Depending on 
findings of previous studies, the average length, or time lag, between the filing of a patent and 
the commercial launch of the medicine is 11-12 years (Sternitzke, 2010). 
2.2 The World Trade Organization 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an organization consisting of 159 countries that 
have agreed to work towards free trade. WTO was founded in 1994 based on the old General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had filled similar functions since 1947. 
WTO meant an expansion of GATT into new areas relevant to trade, such as IPR, foreign 
investments and trade in services. According to WTO rules all members have to ensure that 
domestic laws are in accordance with WTO agreements, meaning that agreements such as 
TRIPS must be adhered to. For reasons discussed below TRIPS has attracted loud criticism 
from various actors and member countries (Fasan, 2012). 
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2.2.1 TRIPS 
The TRIPS-agreement (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property) reached in the 1995 
Uruguay round of trade negotiations has meant stricter IPR for many WTO members, 
especially developing countries. New categories of commodities covered by TRIPS include 
medicines, biological resources and life forms. Article 7 in the agreement describes that the 
hope behind efforts to create a uniform level of intellectual property rights is that it should 
facilitate the transfer of technology and serve to further increase the incentives for investing in 
innovation (World Trade Organization, 1995). TRIPS is the most extensive and far-reaching 
agreement of IPR in history, and the long term goal of the WTO is to see these standards 
implemented globally (Supakankunti, et. al., 2001). Article 27 of the TRIPS-agreement 
specifies that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in 
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable 
of industrial application.” However, members are permitted to exclude diagnostic methods, 
surgical techniques, plants and animals that aren’t micro-organisms from patenting to mention 
some of the possible exceptions (World Trade Organization, 1995). Pharmaceutical product 
patents have long been exempted from patent law by several developing countries for 
humanitarian and public health reasons (Abbott and Reichman, 2007). Once TRIPS was 
agreed upon such countries were given a time period during which they were permitted to 
adjust and alter their patent laws in accordance to TRIPS (World Trade Organization, 1995).  
Many feared that this change in patent laws on medicines would lead to large changes in the 
market for medicines. Critics such as Supakankunti et. al. (2001) talked of increased prices as 
a consequence of decreased competition, fewer medicines available to the poor, and negative 
overall public health effects as final consequence. TRIPS was also speculated as possibly 
resulting in less foreign direct investment (from now on “FDI”) and research and production 
of medicines in developing countries; in other words a higher concentration of advanced 
technologies to developed countries. This can result in a skewed perspective on which areas 
of research need attention and funding, as well as a lower degree of technology transfers 
(Supakankunti, et. al., 2001). Recent studies conducted after the implementation of TRIPS, 
specific in their grading of IPR strength, have shown that there is a statistically significant 
positive effect of strong IPR on FDI. This effect wasn’t found in all industries, but was 
significant to the pharmaceutical industry (Halydier, 2012). 
Complaints voiced from developing countries regarding the social costs that might arise from 
the inability to afford treatments against epidemics (such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis) 
resulted in alterations made to TRIPS commonly referred to as the Doha declaration. The 
Doha declaration allowed for the ability to issue compulsory licenses for medicines refused to 
be supplied at a reasonable price by patent holders, or in cases of national emergency. The 
conditions that need be met for such grants to be possible are specified in Article 31, “Other 
Use Without Authorization of the Right [Patent] Holder”, of the TRIPS-agreement. If the 
necessary preconditions are met then governments are entitled to issue compulsory licences 
entitling domestic producers (or third-party producers in lack of a domestic industry) to 
produce the medicines needed to treat the epidemic for which the patent holder would be duly 
compensated (World Trade Organization, 1995). The permitting of compulsory licences and 
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other safe guards of public health are referred to as “TRIPS flexibilities”. The flexibilities are 
meant to protect public health (Collins-Chase, 2008). Those countries accused of failing to 
comply with TRIPS will be tried under the WTO dispute settlement system, and if found 
guilty WTO procedure-sanctions may be enacted (Suprakankunti, et. al., 2001). 
However, compulsory licences have shown not to be as efficient as intended in solving for 
unreasonable prices or in other times of need. A report conducted by the United Nations in 
2001 showed that developing countries refrain from or hesitate to file for compulsory licences 
out of fear of the repercussions from developed countries (United Nations, 2002). That such 
reservations may not be unwarranted have been illustrated in instances of issued compulsory 
licences, such as for the drug Kaletra in Thailand. The pharmaceutical company Abbott which 
held the patent responded by withdrawing all its patent applications for the Thai market, as 
well as by refraining from introducing an improved version of Kaletra at a later stage. 
Moreover Thailand was also placed on the so-called “priority watch list” meant to shame 
countries (Jain, 2013). 
Article 1 of the TRIPS-agreement states that countries are at a liberty to introduce stricter IPR 
than those under TRIPS, as TRIPS only sets minimum requirements for IPR (World Trade 
Organization, 1995). The US as a country which exports great amounts of intellectual 
property has been trying to negotiate bilateral agreements that mean stricter IPR than under 
TRIPS. These IPR go under the name “TRIPS Plus”. Such negotiations regarding intellectual 
property protection have been held with both Thailand and South Africa and would mean 
protection of intellectual property that surpasses the requirements of TRIPS by far. This has 
caused several legal commentators such as Collins-Chase to warn against what possible 
consequences entering such treaties would have for the public health and development. In 
light of possible negative consequences it is of importance that alterations in IPR are carefully 
scrutinized with regard to social cost before being implemented (Collins-Chase, 2008). 
2.3 WHO: Essential medicines 
The World Health Organization (WHO) is concerned with health and part of the United 
Nations system. WHO works with forming the research agenda on health. It also sets goals for 
how public health can be improved, means of achieving these goals and surveys health trends 
(World Health Organization, 2014b). WHO published its first list of essential medicines 
consisting of 186 medicines in 1977. At the time the publishing was acknowledged as 
bringing attention to the problem of high medicine prices and poor availability of essential 
medicines in many developing countries. Since its first publishing the list has attracted 
attention and critique from many actors. The pharmaceutical industry has argued it too 
restrictive and NGOs have critiqued the list for lacking transparency in its decision process. 
Since its first publishing the amount of medicines included on the list has more than doubled 
(Laing, et. al., 2003). The structure of the list itself has also undergone changes. Up until 2001 
low price was one of the requirements for medicines to be included on the list. This meant 
that many medicines under patent protection, like antiretroviral drugs (ARV-drugs), were 
excluded from the list in spite of their great importance to treatments. Modern versions of the 
list have also been altered to include details on decisions regarding included and excluded 
medicines to increase transparency (Ford, 2004). Investigations have been conducted by the 
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WHO on how prices of medicines on the list of essential medicines have varied. However, as 
criterions for the list have varied and such investigations haven’t been conducted regularly for 
a consistent group of countries, regions or medicines meaning that these investigations offer 
little insight to general trends and effects (World Health Organization, 2014a). 
The WHO has recommended that all countries compose lists of essential medicines. This 
recommendation has been made in light of strives in developing countries to expand the 
coverage of health insurance. The list is supposed to act as a means to estimate and minimize 
the total costs of medicines provided under the health insurance policy, as well as attract 
attention and focus to important medical subjects. Although health insurances may vary 
among countries, as will be illustrated in the case studies, the costliness of treatment is 
naturally of interest to both individuals and governments. If a treatment is very expensive and 
needed by a large share of the population, it may be difficult for governments to afford. Lists 
of essential medicines enable countries to clearly observe the share of patented medicines in 
their total medicine expenditure. The share of patented medicines in expenditure may be large 
in spite of the fact that patented medicines are often few in relation to the amount of generic 
(un-branded) medicines. Only four percent of the essential medicines in Mexico were under 
patent protection in 2012, but represented 56 percent of the total cost of medicines within the 
public sector (Gómez-Dántes et. al., 2012). Comparisons of national lists of essential 
medicines to the WHO list of essential medicines have shown that national lists tend to 
include fewer medicines. Such differences can be understood through natural differences in 
diseases when comparing different countries and continents, but also though the fact that 
national lists tend to be updated more sparsely which can mean a time lag for newer 
medicines (Laing, et. al., 2003).  
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3. Theoretical framework 
3.1 The nature of knowledge: Why are patents needed? 
The nature of patents and knowledge places them within the category of public goods. 
Knowledge generated from innovation and R&D is a public good in the sense that it is 
impossible to prevent others from using, since it is nonrivalrous, thereby creating a free rider 
problem. This makes it difficult for producers and investors to regain investments and charge 
prices reflecting the cost of R&D. The nonrivalrous nature of public goods often results in an 
unwillingness to provide such goods and market failures (Encaoua, et. al., 2006). Patents 
provide a solution by protecting the intellectual property of inventors. Thereby patents can be 
seen as a government policy designed to stimulate private investments (Courvisanos, 2009). 
Patents grant the inventor a temporary monopoly, usually for 20 years, during which time the 
inventor can charge a price higher than the marginal cost of production. In exchange the 
patent applicant must disclose the information behind the patent, which enables imitation and 
further improvements once the patent has expired. Many great innovations have arisen from 
improvements made to older innovations, as can be seen in examples of improvements made 
to pharmaceutical drugs such as insulin and anti-clotting drugs (Scotchmer, 1991). In this 
context patents provide a solution to market failures in the sense of providing incentives for 
investments in innovation and aiding in technology transfer and the spreading of information. 
However, apart from the solving of problems described above patents also come with inherit 
problems, such as through the creation of inefficiencies and poorly specified, too broad, 
patents (Yamabhai, 2012). Thereby the balance between too little protection (meaning a 
feared low innovation and a slow pace of technological development) and too much 
protection (meaning a unnecessarily large deadweight burden) is of importance, but difficult, 
to find (Encaoua, et. al., 2006). 
3.2 Patents and inefficiencies: The Coase theorem 
The inefficiencies that might arise as a consequence of negative externalities in connection to 
property rights have been widely covered in economic models. One such model is the Coase 
theorem, which states that given zero or negligible transactions costs the matter of who is in 
possession of a property right is irrelevant as bargaining will lead to a satisfactory solution to 
all involved parties. Externalities arise as a consequence on non-excludability, to which 
patents provide a solution. When everything is owned the problem of externalities is resolved: 
in the example of a polluted river the pollution may be prevented if someone holds the right to 
do so. If a public good is internalised in a group with a set amount of members, then these 
members will negotiate agreements that set the amount of externality at the optimal level for 
all parties, given low transaction costs and a possibility to bargain. Agreements such as 
TRIPS regarding IPR could be seen at such an attempt to limit the level of externality. 
(Harris, 1990) 
3.3 The downside of patents 
The negative aspects connected to intellectual property rights is not limited to the 
inefficiencies brought by the establishment of monopoly power, but also to the hindering of 
information diffusion and spreading, thus the downside of patents is twofold (Encaoua, et. al., 
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2006). Critics such as McDonald (2002) have argued that patents are primarily a legal 
document, and that patent lawyers try their utmost to only include the information needed to 
defend the patent, which often means that it is not specific enough to allow for imitation once 
the patent has expired. Thereby the holders of patents can be argued as cheating society from 
the rewards promised at the expiration date of the patent (McDonald, 2002). Mazzoleni and 
Nelson (1998) point to that innovation has long been the driving motor behind 
industrialisation of developed countries, such as the US and Britain, in a time when patent 
laws weren’t as extensive as presently. This makes it wrong of developed countries to place 
such high demands on IPR compliance on developing countries. Where social costs provide 
grounds for doing so it is key to impose softer IPR, such as in developing countries, with 
medicines being one example (Mazzoleni, Nelson, 1998). This might also increase the gap 
between developed and developing countries as prominent economists such as Stiglitz (2008) 
have theorized that the gap stems from disparities in information, and not just resources. This 
might make global patent agreements such as TRIPS harmful to development in the sense that 
they hinder the spreading and diffusion of information which is necessary in order to promote 
growth and development in developing countries. This matter has become of increasing 
importance in a modern society which is highly centred on information and knowledge 
(Stiglitz, 2008). This phenomenon is not limited to developing countries, but can be seen in 
developed countries such as the United States as well. In the US after the patent of a medicine 
expires its price drops on average by 60 percent given the competition of one generic 
producer, with 10 competitors the price drops by 29 percent (Oliviera, et. al. 2004). 
The problem with a global system of IPR is of course that it is difficult to set a standard of 
IPR that is suitable to everyone. The system of IPR most suitable to industrialised developed 
countries such as the US might not be the same as the optimal system for IPR to the 
developing country of Ecuador. Although the need for medicines of the ill, perhaps terminally 
so, in developing countries may be great these patients simply can’t afford to pay that which 
is asked for medicines. Thereby these patients make a group of potential consumers that 
attract very little interest from pharmaceutical companies in terms of future research 
attentions (Stiglitz, 2008). That which primarily concerns patents in connection to public 
health is the need to find a balance between economic profits and social costs. Not in the least 
since the right to medical treatment is listed and mentioned as a basic human right and 
included in the millennium goals (Gupta et. al., 2013). Other critics such as Gupta (2004) 
have voiced concern regarding the impact increased patent protection will have on the 
markets of generic medicines. Not the least will this mean a decreased pressure on more 
efficient and innovative production processes, but also mean no price competition as the 
patent holder will be able to charge monopolistic profits for the minimum 20-year duration of 
the patent (Gupta, 2004). This is argued necessary for innovation to occur, but contradictory 
to neo-classical models in which goods should be priced according to their marginal cost 
(McDonald, 2002).  
3.4 The merits of patents 
Since knowledge has no marginal cost and production costs are comparatively low, it would 
be difficult to make profits on medicines without some kind of protection of intellectual 
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property. The traditional view of patents as described by many economists is that while 
patents may have a market-distorting effect, they are at times a necessary incentive and 
protection for innovation to take place. However, this being said there are diverging opinions 
regarding the overall effect of patents on economic growth. The prevailing modern view, as is 
reflected in regulations and trade agreements, is that patents are of benefit to economic growth 
since they encourage innovation. Without patents the small possibility of being able to 
financially benefit from innovations would deter innovators from investing in innovation. 
This view has led to a general movement towards stricter patent regulations and a wider 
approval of patents worldwide. The TRIPS-agreement can be seen as an integral part of this 
work, but there are also other efforts directed towards broadening the acknowledgement of 
patents internationally (Moser, 2013). It is believed by some that the patent system will have 
many long-term benefits, such as a stimulation of R&D that might otherwise be considered 
too risky from the viewpoint that the investments made might be difficult to recoup. The 
introduction of patents in developing countries is hoped to mean an increased focus on 
medicines relevant to common tropical diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis and also 
HIV/AIDS. Patent protection will increase the probability of being able to profit from such 
research (Gupta, 2004).  
Such hopes are placed on the long-term effect of TRIPS on the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry. Barnes (2003) has argued that since the Indian patent act for pharmaceutical 
products has been so weak historically, there has been little incentive for Indian 
pharmaceutical companies to engage in R&D. There is a slight need to invest in research to 
discover own medicines when the freeriding on the discoveries of others is relatively cheaper 
and carries such large potential markets. This can also be argued as having contributed to the 
comparatively little attention that has been devoted to diseases mainly afflicting developing 
countries. Had Indian pharmaceutical companies engaged in more own research, then perhaps 
these efforts could have been placed within areas more relevant to developing countries, 
unlike pharmaceutical companies in developed countries. While it may be justified to argue 
the difficulties for most developing countries to engage in such research, the situation for 
India with its large pharmaceutical sector is arguably different from most other developing 
nations (Barnes, 2003). 
3.5 Are patents really necessary? 
Schumpeter had another theory connected to innovation and monopolies that is commonly 
referred to as Schumpeterian competition. The theory behind this notion is that innovation 
results in temporary monopolies. As inventors try to replace each other’s inventions to gain 
monopoly Schumpeterian competition arises. This results in a kind of intense competition 
(Tang, 2006). However, critics like Stiglitz (2008) argue that the concept of a temporary 
nature of monopolies that Schumpeter refers to is flawed. Monopolies are rarely temporary, 
but have often proved to be long-lasting in nature, both from information withholding, but 
also through the creation of IPR and patents. Stiglitz exemplifies this by mentioning possible 
network externalities and costs connected to switching, as can be seen in the monopoly power 
gained by Microsoft within software (Stiglitz, 2008). Moreover, several studies, as one 
conducted by Tang (2006) on firms in Canada, have failed to find a strong connection among 
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monopolies between competition and innovation, which would indicate that Schumpeter’s 
theory proves lacking in relation to reality (Tang, 2006). 
Economists such as Moser (2013) and Allen (1983) have suggested patents to be redundant to 
innovation and economic growth based on studies of economic history proving that both 
economic growth, and industrialization, is processes achievable without the protections of 
patents. In a paper investigating the effect of patents on innovation in a historical context 
Moser (2013) found that historically the bulk of innovation has occurred outside of the patent 
system.(Moser, 2013). Historical evidence indicates that innovation has frequently arisen as a 
consequence of knowledge sharing outside the patent system. Allen (1983) observed this 
phenomenon when studying the 19
th
 century iron and steel industry in Britain and denoted it 
“collective innovation”. Many of the important discoveries to productivity growth within the 
industry were made by various individuals who didn’t file patents for their discoveries. Allen 
concludes that under the 19
th
 century and the then prevailing circumstances collective 
innovation was perhaps the most important source of inventions, since it allowed for 
cumulative advancement (Allen, 1983). Moser (2013) has also made use of historical data 
from exhibits on innovation and prizes awarded for best innovation to compare inventions 
from countries with and without patent legislation. When considering the period 1851-1876 
the investigation revealed a large amount of high-quality innovations coming from countries 
without patent legislation. This is concurring with the line of theory that emphasizes that 
technological advancement is shaping patent law and driving the increased possibility to 
patent, as opposed to patents encouraging and fostering innovation. In this sense it is of 
utmost importance not to grant too broad patents, which could thereby hinder or deter from 
further innovation, both within and outside the established patent laws (Moser, 2013). 
3.6 Alternatives to patenting 
Not all research is motivated by promises of profit, as is illustrated in open source coding, but 
research can be driven by many other reasons perhaps unrelated to profits which then makes 
intellectual property protection redundant in terms of motivation. This being said, the need for 
funding research is still important. In response to the argument that the protection of 
intellectual property is necessary in order to motivate and spur investments in research and 
innovation it has been argued that there are other ways to receive funding that might make 
such demands redundant. Examples of other means of financing include government funding 
and university research. That such research should be of importance is illustrated in many 
examples of inventions that have grown to be of importance over history. The fact is that not 
all of these have fallen under the protection offered by IPR, as is illustrated in the recent 
movement within software towards open source coding. This illustrates that monopoly on 
intellectual property may neither be necessary nor the most efficient way to protect and spur 
innovation (Encaoua, et. al., 2006).  
Among those who suggest that the patent system is ill-equipped in its design to achieve the 
objectives of increased innovation and development there have been suggestions of other 
means to incentivize innovation. One such suggestion proposed by Stiglitz (2008) would be to 
offer prizes to anyone that would come up with an innovation living up to a predetermined set 
of objectives. This could be a vaccine for malaria for instance, and is an idea which has been 
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used in the past to encourage work to find mechanical chimney sweeps for instance. Among 
the benefits listed for such an innovation encouragement system are a smaller need for 
advertising and that it would have less of a distortionary effect than creating temporary 
monopolies (Stiglitz, 2008). 
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4. Methodology and data 
4.1 Research design  
In answering the research question case study-methodology will be used to investigate how 
TRIPS has affected price and availability of essential medicines in India, Thailand, South 
Africa and Brazil. Case study-methodology has been chosen in order to get a more detailed 
view on prices and availability of essential medicines, and in extension the public health 
situations of the chosen countries have been affected by TRIPS. Systems for both health care 
providing and patent law have varied in the studied countries which makes a qualitative study 
more appropriate, since this enables accounting for such differences in the analysis. In 
answering the research question the paper strives to use information relating to the subject on 
several different levels, and subcomponents of the four cases of India, Thailand, South Africa 
and Brazil to give a full understanding. The analysis of the information obtained will be 
guided by the theory discussed in the theoretical framework. However, there are also limits 
and weaknesses connected to using case study methodology. Commonly mentioned problems 
of case study methodology include a possible lack of internal and external validity and 
possible difficulties to reproduce the study. However, depending on the structure of the case 
study many problems can be mitigated (Saunders et. al., 2012). Another factor which makes 
case study-methodology necessary to the paper is the need to consider both the phenomenon 
of medical patents as such, as well as the context within which medical patents are introduced, 
since the context is thought to hold valuable explanatory value (De Vaus, 2011). 
Possible threats to internal validity arise from other factors than the key variables of interest 
influencing the outcome. However, an idiographic structure which focuses on a set of 
particular factors or events and thereby tries to develop an understanding or explanation of the 
case is commonly considered as sufficient to avoid the problem of lacking internal validity. 
Problems of lacking external validity are often considered large in connection to case studies. 
This means that there is no basis provided by case studies upon which generalizations can be 
made. The findings of the case cannot with confidence be considered as being representative 
of a broad group of other cases, primarily due to the number of cases being too small to make 
findings statistically significant. In the context of this thesis it means that the findings on 
effects of TRIPS on medicine prices, availability and public health cannot be used to draw 
conclusions of the effects of TRIPS in other countries. Therefore it is of utmost importance to 
be careful in making generalizations. As this study includes countries with differing patent 
legislation prior to TRIPS, differing disease burdens and differing initial approaches to 
TRIPS, the need for cases with different conditions can be argued as having been satisfied 
(De Vaus, 2011). 
India, Thailand, South Africa and Brazil have been chosen as case studies out of countries 
having implemented TRIPS, and include information on their general health profile, previous 
patent legislation, changes in medicine prices and medicine availability. Medicines discussed 
in case studies are all included on WHO’s list of essential medicines. The case studies will be 
contrasted with each other to detect any alterations in medicine prices and availability, and if 
this appears related to changes in public health. Public health will be commented upon by 
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putting what is found regarding prices and availability of medicines in the studied countries in 
relation to their respective disease burdens.  
4.2 Sources 
Obtaining reliable information is of great importance to any study, and not the least for case 
studies. Therefore all papers and data sources have been evaluated carefully. The paper has 
mainly used published papers on innovation, patents and TRIPS in establishing the previous 
research section and theoretical framework. In order to be able to answer the three research 
questions case studies of the four chosen countries (India, Thailand, South Africa and Brazil) 
were used. All of the chosen papers and case studies were published in well-renowned papers 
and are therefore deemed as trustworthy. The data obtained from this will be completed by 
information and data from WHO, which is regarded as a prominent institution thought 
trustworthy. If there is any relevant critique or questions to materials used this will be 
mentioned. This will establish a fundamental understanding of essential medicines and what 
importance this might carry for developing countries. 
4.3 Limitations 
This thesis will not consider all aggregated types of patents. As this is a paper of a limited 
format it will only consider the TRIPS-agreement and patents on medicines since this is that 
which primarily relevant to the subject and the research questions. Therefore no general 
answer regarding whether or not patents as a whole are beneficial to innovation, development 
and economic growth will be offered.  
Felicia Ardenmark Strand Master thesis Spring 2014 
17 
 
5. Cases 
5.1 India 
5.1.1 General health and the health system in India 
India spent 4.05 percent of its GDP on health care in 2012. This corresponds to $61.4 per 
capita (World Health Organization, 2014c). India faces a large disease burden of both non-
communicable afflictions with expensive treatments, such as diabetes, cancer and heart 
disease and communicable diseases such as AIDS (Yip and Mahal, 2008). Close to the 
regional average of 169 people per 100 000 in India suffered from HIV in 2013. 1523 people 
out of every 100 000 got infected with malaria in 2013, which is slightly above the regional 
(South East Asian) average of 1462, but lower than the global average of 3752 people per 
100 000. The Indian population also suffers from pneumonia, dengue fever, tuberculosis, 
some of which are difficult to treat due to being medicine resistant. Factors which contribute 
to the spreading of the diseases in India are poor drinking water and poor hygiene, something 
which mainly affects people living in poor and rural areas (World Health Organization, 
2014d). There are large differences in health within the Indian population that vary depending 
on gender, education, caste, wealth and geography. This can be seen in large differences in 
life expectancy between Indian regions. In the region of Madhya Pradesh life expectancy is 56 
years, whereas in Kerala life expectancy is 74 years (Balarajan, 2011). 
Under the Indian constitution public health is a responsibility of the states, therefore the states 
are expected to provide the bulk of the funding of public health services. Public health care in 
India is available free of charge or offered to a nominal charge to those in need of medical 
attention. This being said there are often added out of pocket expenditures. Added 
expenditures which may arise include cost of medicine treatments, medical (laboratory) tests 
and hospitalization costs. This has led to claims that the government should seek to increase 
its funding by for instance establishing health insurance programs. Moreover, the public 
health system in India is considered to be of poor quality due to lacks in financing, quality- 
and access- problems (lacking essential medicines and supplies). This has been pointed to as 
one of the contributing factors of the large financial burden placed on Indian households in 
need of medical attention. Investigations of the Indian health providing system have shown 
that those who can afford it prefer to seek care in the private health system. Many households 
are unable to afford full or partial insurance that would cover medical expenses (Ellis, et. al. 
2000). 
In 2008 only 15 percent of the Indian population was reported as having any type of health 
insurance, mainly through their employer (Yip and Mahal, 2008). By 2011 the share of 
population covered by health insurance was reported to have dropped to 10 percent 
(Balarajan, 2011). Although the possibility of private health insurance became available in 
1999, only about 1 percent of the Indian population had used this opportunity by 2008. This 
means that the bulk of the Indian population will have to pay for added expenditures out of 
their own pocket. India has committed to spending more money on health care to alleviate the 
monetary problems of the rural and poor population, and to address its disease burden. One 
such action directed towards achieving this goal is the governments’ establishment of a 
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heavily subsidized voluntary health insurance system for the poor introduced in 2003. 
However, enrollment in the insurance policy has been low (Yip and Mahal, 2008). 
Investigations into health expenditures of the Indian population have shown that in 2004-2005 
about 39 million people in India fell into poverty as a consequence of medical expenditures, 
not taking into account those already under the poverty line (Balarajan, 2011). 
5.1.2 Indian patent law prior to TRIPS 
Prior to the implementation of TRIPS India did not permit patents on pharmaceutical 
products. The Indian decision on denying patents on medicines was made in the 1970 Patent 
Act, a law which still permitted patents on manufacturing processes, but prohibited patents on 
the medicines themselves. The removal of patent protection led to a thriving production of 
cheaper generic medicines and labelled India as pharmacy of the developing world according 
to organizations such as Médecins sans Frontiéres (Chaudhuri, 2012). 
The decision made regarding TRIPS in the 1994 GATT-round meant that India as a WTO 
member would have to alter its practices regarding patents on medicines. These changes 
would have to be completed by 2005, which still meant a near ten years later than most other 
countries that agreed to comply with TRIPS. Exceptions on the starting date of TRIPS were 
made for countries that did not recognize pharmaceutical patents prior to TRIPS, so as to offer 
a transition period. This meant that pharmaceutical companies in India could continue to 
manufacture generic copies of medicines until 2005. Such generic imitations could also be 
exported and sold to other places in the world, most notably resulting in the famous pirate-pill 
story of HIV-blocking drugs sold to African countries (Kotwani, 2013). In 2004, right before 
the Indian implementation of TRIPS, India was supplying 22 percent of the generic medicines 
of the world (Jain, 2013). Once the implementation of TRIPS in 2005 had been ruled upon 
India established a mailbox for patent applications. The mailbox was designed to work as a 
transitional measure in the years 1995-2004 in which patents applications would be received 
and stored up until the date when TRIPS was introduced to Indian patent law (Chadhuri, et. al. 
2010). The changes on the 1
st
 of January 2005 concretely meant an extended patent term 
(from 7 to 20 years), the possibility to patent medicines as well as micro-organisms (and not 
just production processes) (Jain, 2013). 
The new Indian patent law still permits generic companies to produce and export generic 
medicines to the least developed countries of the world (where the introduction of TRIPS has 
postponed until 2016) and includes what according to legal commentators is “the most 
extensive provisions on compulsory licensing” among countries with TRIPS (Mueller, 2007, 
p.542). Although India has included some safeguards to protect public health in its new patent 
legislation, such as strict laws on patentability (affecting the possibility of secondary patents 
getting approved among other things), the amount of patents granted on essential medicines 
have led critical voices from the UN to argue that these safeguards appear insufficient and 
aren’t employed fully (Chadhuri, et. al. 2010).  
5.1.3 Prices of medicines 
Many Indian pharmaceutical firms specialized in reverse-engineering medicines invented in 
other foreign markets. Since reverse-engineering is less costly than R&D conducted the result 
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has been far less expensive Indian medicines (Gupta, 2004). The impact of the large Indian 
generic industry can be seen in studies which have shown that prior to the introduction of 
TRIPS the price difference when comparing branded medicines to generic medicines could be 
as large as 90 percent. As prices of medicines drop substantially as a patent expires and 
generically produced versions become available, it is interesting is to investigate how TRIPS 
has affected this process (Gupta et. al., 2013). As a consequence of the removal of the patent 
restriction and expiring patents on several prominent patented medicines MNCs began to have 
a greater interest in the market for generic medicines as well. This presented itself through the 
takeover of several Indian firms and partner agreements signed with Indian firms. Fewer 
actors and producers in the pharmaceutical market meant a decreased competition which in 
itself is likely to contribute to increased prices (Chaudhuri, 2012). 
The applications in India’s so-called mailbox were made available to the public on the 1st of 
January 2005 when the Indian Patent Office began processing its patent applications. This 
revealed that many of the filed applications were in fact secondary patent applications, 
meaning a patent application which covers ancillary features of an existing patent used to 
delay the manufacturing of generic medicines. This meant that the opening of India’s mailbox 
brought on lengthy legal proceedings between generic manufacturers and Multinational 
corporations (from now on “MNCs”). Examples of such medicines include Roche’s anti-
cancer drug Tarceva and Gilead’s anti-HIV drug Viread. Such actions speak against the self-
professed will of large pharmaceutical companies to work towards increased medicine 
affordability among the poor in developed countries, since these lawsuits (even if eventually 
not won) have complicated the manufacturing and selling of cheaper generic medicines 
(Chadhuri, et. al. 2010). Novartis filed a patent for its drug Gleevec (or Glivec) which treats 
leukemia in 2006. The branded drug is sold at $26 000 dollars per yearly treatment, 
contrasting with the generic version sold for about $2600, which is unaffordable to many 
Indians. Novartis’ patent filing for Gleevac was rejected, on the grounds of it counting as 
“evergreening”, a practice among pharmaceutical companies to make minor improvements to 
drugs with expiring patents and then file for a new patent. Such a patent application will only 
be granted in the case of a substantial improvement in efficiency, though what constitutes a 
substantial improvement is not defined by the law (Mueller, 2007). 
A study conducted by Chaudhuri (2012) which aimed to investigate the effect TRIPS, and the 
increased amount of multinational companies and monopolies, have had on Indian prices on 
medicines revealed that prices have indeed increased since 2005. The in the words of the 
author “exorbitant prices” are mainly to be found within treatments for life threatening 
diseases, such as cancer. The author points to the similarities this bears to the state of the 
Indian medicine market prior to the abolishment of patent protection on medicines in the 
1970’s (Chaudhuri, 2012, p.53). An investigation of price changes of a group of medicines on 
the list of essential medicines comparing 1996 to 2006, just after the implementation of 
TRIPS in India, show that in that period the prices went up by 15 percent (accounting for 
inflation). This goes to illustrate that TRIPS is unlikely to have made essential medicines 
more affordable in India. Especially since only 30 percent of the Indian population could 
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afford modern medicines in 1993, prior to the implementation of TRIPS, in spite of medicine 
prices in India being among the lowest in the world (Balarajan, 2011). 
5.1.4 Availability of medicines 
An econometric analysis using product sales data from market research firms such as IMS 
Health Inc. to investigate the availability of new medicines in countries around the world 
found that new medicines were less likely to be found in developing countries with 
historically weak IPR, such as Brazil and India, than in developed countries with more secure 
IPR, such as Germany, even after the implementation of TRIPS. Using Spain as a base 
country the group of investigated essential medicines were only 35 percent as likely to be 
patented and sold in India despite its TRIPS compliance. The explanation for this might lie in 
studies which have found that market exclusivity in India is difficult to obtain, even after the 
implementation of TRIPS. In a studied sample of newly introduced drugs on the Indian 
market more than 70 percent were manufactured by two producers or more, implying up to 70 
percent chance of there being a generic version. In an econometric study of how many new 
medicines were introduced into developing markets it was found that less than two thirds of 
the new medicines in the sample were available on the Indian market. Though this means a 
cost of consumers due to a loss of cutting-edge medicines, it could be argued as being 
compensated for by lower prices of generic drugs (Berndt, et. al., 2011).  
Bird (2009) has also pointed to high Indian tariffs on imported pharmaceuticals as a barrier to 
receiving essential medicines. Indian tariffs on pharmaceutical imports are currently at 55 
percent, as a protectionist measure directed towards protecting and fostering India’s 
pharmaceutical industry. In the new era of TRIPS this can mean significant added costs to 
medicines that are under patent protection and imported from other countries. It has been 
estimated that if China, Brazil, India and Nigeria lowered their current high tariffs on 
imported medicines, then half of the world’s population would get a much improved access to 
essential medicines. This can of course be disputed by stating that the imported patented 
medicines are usually too expensive to begin with, but naturally matters aren’t improved by 
high tariffs (Bird, 2009). 
5.1.5 Competition 
A study conducted by the UN to investigate the pharmaceutical market in India five years 
after the implementation of TRIPS showed that the market had undergone some change since 
the changes in patent law were made. The new policy-environment led to increased 
collaboration between Indian pharmaceutical companies and international MNCs, as well as 
mergers and acquisitions. This has meant decreased competition in the market, to the 
detriment of consumers. The study also offered evidence that disproved the hope of TRIPS 
resulting in an increased R&D-focus of Indian pharmaceutical companies in tropical diseases 
relevant to developing countries, but neglected by pharmaceutical companies of the developed 
countries. Although R&D expenditure increased under the investigated period among firms 
with heavy R&D expenditure (37 out of a total 166 firms) from 3.89 percent in 2001 to 8.35 
percent in 2006, most of this research was devoted to developing generic medicines of expired 
patents and establishing them in the markets of developed countries and new medicines with 
more lucrative markets. The study concluded that even after TRIPS the strength of the Indian 
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pharmaceutical market lies within the manufacturing and export of generic medicines. The 
remaining firms showed a near constant of 1 percent of budgets being spent on R&D under 
the investigated period (Chadhuri, et. al. 2010). 
5.2 Thailand 
5.2.1 The health system and general health in Thailand 
Thailand spent 3.93 percent of its GDP on health care in 2012, or $215.1 per capita (World 
Health Organization, 2014c). 663 people per 100 000 in Thailand suffered from HIV in 2013, 
which is well above the regional (South East Asian) average of 185, and also places Thailand 
above the global average of 511. In contrast only 205 people out of every 100 000 got 
infected with malaria in 2013, well below the regional average of 1462. Aside from problems 
of infectious diseases such as AIDS, diarrhea, malaria and tuberculosis the Thai population 
also suffers from non-communicable diseases such as cancer, respiratory diseases and asthma. 
12 percent of all deaths in Thailand in 2010 were from cancer, whereas communicable 
diseases held a 17 percent share of all deaths (World Health Organization, 2014e). 
Thailand has had a system of universal health care in place since October 2001 
(Tangcharoensathien, et. al. 2002). Prior to this there were large inequalities reported among 
rural and urban areas, as well as between rich and poor citizens. The previous system was 
financed by user fees (about 20 percent), tax money and public and private third party payers. 
The old Thai system of health insurance was organized to protected groups of people. There 
was also the possibility of purchasing a private health insurance which partially or fully 
reimbursed medical costs (Pannarunothai and Mills, 1997). These measures only covered 
about 70 percent of the Thai population (more or less partially), which meant that 
approximately 30 percent were left completely without insurance coverage. A universal health 
insurance was introduced in 2001, which meant that the entire Thai population was covered. 
The new insurance was funded by general tax revenue and a fixed payment of 30 Baht per 
visit to the hospital (Tangcharoensathien, et. al. 2002). The drugs prescribed under the 
insurance policy were limited to those on a national list and some treatments for chronic 
diseases and other high-cost treatments were subject to price ceilings, meaning among other 
things no entitlement to ARV-drugs for AIDS-patients. The new rule in Thailand after the 
military coup in 2006 chose to remove the 30 Baht fee and make the insurance free of charge 
instead (Hughes and Leethongdee, 2007). 
5.2.2 Thai patent law prior to TRIPS 
Reports written by NGOs such as Médecins sans Frontiéres point to a long history of trade 
pressures being placed on Thailand to implement stricter protection on intellectual property, 
such as through threats to implement sanctions on prominent Thai export commodities like 
jewelry, and wood. These pressures have led to early implementation of many IPR as can be 
seen in the establishment of pharmaceutical process patents in 1979, pharmaceutical product 
patents in 1995 and restricted possibilities on compulsory licenses placed in 1998 (Collins-
Chase, 2008). 
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5.2.3 Prices 
Thailand’s compliance with TRIPS increased its budgetary expenses of providing medicines 
to a new total of 10 percent of its total government budget. In 2007 this motivated the Thai 
government to issue three compulsory licenses against medicines patented by MNCs: against 
Abbott for its drug Kaletra, against Merck for its drug Efavirenz (both Kaletra and Efavirenz 
are ARV-drugs) and Sanofi-Aventis for its drug Plavix (which is used for coronary disease 
treatments). The licenses were issued for generic imports from India. Before its issuing of 
compulsory licenses the Thai government had attempted long negotiations with the mentioned 
pharmaceutical companies for price reductions, but to no avail. At the time of the issuing of a 
compulsory license for Efavirenz Merck’s price was almost double that of the Indian generic 
version, and Thailand expected to achieve a 20 percent price reduction for its generic imports 
of Kaletra. As a response to this action Abbott chose to withdraw all of its pending patent 
applications for the Thai market (Abbott and Reichman, 2007). 
That strong patent protection has influenced the price of medicines in Thailand is illustrated in 
many examples of drugs that have been on the market with few or no substitutes, thereby 
resulting in high prices. The drug Fluconazole used to treat HIV patients is among the 
medicines listed on WHO’s list of essential medicines. Up until 1998 the patent for 
Fluconazole was held by Pfizer, which thereby possessed monopoly rights to sell Fluconazole 
on the Thai market. When Pfizer’s patent expired in 1998 the price of Fluconazole dropped by 
about 98 percent, thereby illustrating the effect an introduction of competition can have on 
prices. (Ford, 2004) A comparison of the present price of Fluconazole in Thailand and Kenya 
(where it is under patent protection) reveals stark contrasts in price. A daily dose in 2008 of 
Fluconazole costs 70 cents in Thailand, whereas the same daily dose costs 20 dollars in 
Kenya. This illustrates what difference in price generics can mean (Collins-Chase, 2008). 
5.2.4 Availability 
Thailand is one of the countries that have tried to implement the option to issue compulsory 
licenses for production of medicines often mentioned in connection to TRIPS as a possible 
safeguard of health. In the period 2006-2007 Thailand issued two compulsory licenses for the 
manufacturing of two medicines aimed at treating patients with AIDS. Although the licenses 
were in accordance with TRIPS this still held repercussions for Thailand, both from the 
pharmaceutical industry and from other countries. Abbott, the pharmaceutical company which 
held the patent for one of the medicines, Kaletra, responded by withdrawing all its products 
that were awaiting patent approval in Thailand and has withheld registration of any new 
medications since. This includes an improved version of Kaletra, the drug for which a 
compulsory license was issued. Another consequence of the Thai compulsory licensing was 
that Thailand was placed on a so-called “priority watch list” meant to shame the countries 
listed by the US trade representative (Jain, 2013). The acting of the Thai government has also 
been strongly criticized by the industry chamber of commerce. However, after some initial 
confusion the official stance of the EU was in support of Thailand’s actions, in spite of a letter 
sent from European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson with veiled threats of economic 
reprisal. The Thai government responded to the action taken against it by stating that it would 
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bring any wrongfully imposed sanctions to the WTO dispute settlement (Abbott and 
Reichman, 2007). 
5.3 South Africa 
5.3.1 The health system and general health in South Africa 
South Africa spent 8.79 percent of its GDP on health care in 2012 or in per capita figures 
$644.6 (World Health Organization, 2014c). 11 589 people out of every 100 000 in South 
Africa are infected with HIV, an estimated 6.4 million in total. This makes HIV the heaviest 
of South Africa’s disease burdens. The regional (African) average of people suffering from 
HIV is 2774 per 100 000, and the global average is 511, which puts the large South African 
share into perspective. South Africa also has a higher than average amount of people suffering 
from tuberculosis, 857 per 100 000, which is above the regional average of 303 and the global 
average of 169. 67 percent out of all deaths in South Africa in 2010 were from communicable 
diseases. Other figures interesting to note are the 3 percent share of total deaths from diabetes 
and the 7 percent share represented by deaths from cancer (World Health Organization, 
2014f). The health profile of South Africa shows that infectious diseases predominately affect 
the poor, whereas chronic diseases affect rich and poor alike. The rich of South Africa can be 
said as having completed the epidemiological transition, whereas the poor still suffer from 
many pathologies of both communicable and non-communicable kind (Sanders and Chopra, 
2006). 
Estimations have found that in South Africa alone the lives of over 200 000 AIDS infected 
could be spared per year given access to antiretrovirals (ARVs). The cost of treatment for 
those suffering from AIDS is high – in South Africa a treatment consisting of three ARV 
medicines yearly costs $2000 in the private sector and $750 in the public sector. This is 
unaffordable to many, since the median yearly income in South Africa is $1000. Such 
statistics illustrate the importance of increasing competition to reduce prices and permitting 
manufacturing of generic drugs. Introducing even stricter protection of intellectual property 
would be a step in the wrong direction if the goal is to decrease medicine prices, increase 
access to essential drugs and improve public health and life expectancy (Collins-Chase, 
2008). 
When Nelson Mandela came to power in 1994 he started to execute major changes to the 
health policies in South Africa aimed at improving public health, such as making health care 
for pregnant women and children younger than six free of charge. In 1997 the government 
produced a “White paper on the transformation of the health system in South Africa” aimed at 
creating a unified, single health system for all though directives. Health policy in South Africa 
is developed on a national basis and then adapted so as to fit regional needs. However, such 
change proved difficult given existing regulations and the state of public health in South 
Africa with an escalating crisis of AIDS. This meant a delay until 2003 before the 
propositions were turned into law (Whiteside, 2014). In spite of great ambitions of creating an 
equal health system for all it was shown that the per capita health investment of the South 
African government declined by 14.1 percent between 1995 and 2002, with an annual 
increase in health expenditure by 0.3 percent between 1998 and 2002. There were also great 
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gaps in resource distribution among richer and poorer districts, where the districts showing 
the greatest deprivation levels got the least resources (Sanders and Chopra, 2006). Only a 
smaller share of government health expenditure actually befalls public health care and the 
poor, as can be seen in the fact that in 2012 44 percent of health expenditure was spent on the 
16 percent of population with private health insurance (Whiteside, 2014). Human resources 
have also transitioned in favor of the private sector, with a shift from 40 percent of physicians 
caring for patients with health insurance in 1975 to 66 percent in 2004. This shows a trend 
even after 1994 towards growth of the private medical sector and a strong trend for medical 
practitioners to work in the private sector (Benatar, 2004). 
5.3.2 South African patent law prior to TRIPS 
Prior to TRIPS the Patent Act of 1978 and the Intellectual Property Laws governed patents in 
South Africa. Patents on pharmaceutical products were permitted, but the law gave the 
government great flexibility in compulsory licensing opportunities (International Intellectual 
Property Institute, 2000). The South African attitude towards TRIPS has to be considered 
within the context of the state of the nation in the time around 1995. At this point in time, the 
early 1990’s, South Africa was on its path towards trying to remove the remnants of its 
apartheid regime. Trade liberalization was perceived as something positive to the future 
development of the nation, and a welcome end to the years of trade isolation as a consequence 
of some nations choosing to use their trade power to boycott the apartheid regime. According 
to many commentators this meant a more positive attitude towards some of the changes 
proposed by the WTO at the time, since they were perceived as means to help in abolishing 
apartheid, but this also meant a less negative attitude towards TRIPS than in other developing 
countries, most notably India and Brazil as they represent two of the four chosen countries 
(Klug, 2012). 
5.3.3 Prices 
Historically generic manufacturers haven’t had a large market in South Africa. This is mainly 
due to the structure of the pharmaceutical market and its division during the time of apartheid. 
Private markets represented the largest value for pharmaceutical companies, as can be seen in 
the fact that 80 percent of South Africa’s total health expenditure was found in private 
markets in the early markets 1990’s. This changed after the fall of apartheid once the 
government decided to increase the quality of public care and make it available to everyone at 
low cost, meaning struggles in affording medicines (Klug, 2012). 
South Africa has also had its confrontations over medicine prices with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and companies. One such debate was held as early after the implementation of 
TRIPS as in 1999 when South Africa tried to negotiate a compulsory license for the US 
government funded medicine AZT. AZT is an ARV-drug meant for HIV patients and was 
sorely needed by the South African population at a time when the AIDS infected increased at 
a great speed. The US government refused to negotiate price levels on AZT, which made it 
very difficult to afford for South Africa. A monthly supply of AZT would in 1999 have cost 
each patient $240 per month, in contrast to the generic Indian produced version which cost 
$48 dollars per month. At the time given the amount of patients in need of the medicine and 
the intention of the South African government to distribute the medicine free of charge a cost 
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of $240 per monthly treatment for each patient was simply too great for the South African 
budget. In reaction to this South Africa protested against the unwillingness of the US 
government to reduce the price of AZT, which led to a heated debate over R&D expenditure 
for medicines, and the need for companies to recoup sunk costs (Bond, 1999). 
5.3.4 Availability 
As a result to its inability to afford providing ill with medicines South Africa tried to pass an 
amendment to its patent law which soon became contested. The 1997 Amendment Act 
authorized the South African Minister of Health to issue compulsory licenses for parallel 
imports of generic medicines from third party countries. As mentioned above this led to much 
heated debate among other countries and in the pharmaceutical industry, arguing that the 
amendment failed to comply with the South African constitution and TRIPS and threats of 
various repercussions, but the legal battle was eventually won by South Africa (Kongolo, 
2001). However, in spite of this the damage can in many ways be seen as having been done to 
the health of many South Africans. During the two years of the battle over South Africa’s 
desire to file for compulsory licenses its program for ARV distribution hung in the air. In this 
time patients already infected with HIV could have been provided with medication and further 
attempts to curb the spread of the disease could have been made. This being said the denial of 
top government officials that HIV causes AIDS is popularly attributed as the largest reason 
why South Africa’s share of population suffering from AIDS is presently among the largest in 
the world (Bird, 2009). 
It has been argued that the weak infrastructure and poor education of South Africa would have 
made it difficult to distribute medicines even if patent laws had made cheaper generic 
medicines readily available. Thereby it is a bit simplistic to blame pharmaceutical companies 
and patents for the AIDS crisis in South Africa and other developing countries (Barnes, 
2003). Other official reports such as the International Intellectual Property Institute support 
Barnes in arguing that poor infrastructure (which complicates storing medicines, 
administering medicines and testing of patients) is a large problem in both South Africa and 
other Sub-Saharan African countries, which means that any problems in availability of 
medicines can hardly be completely assigned to TRIPS. This being said, there is also a broad 
agreement that patents have had an influence on availability (International Intellectual 
Property Institute, 2000). 
5.4 Brazil 
5.4.1 The health system and general health in Brazil 
Brazil spent 9.31 percent of its GDP on health care in 2012. This corresponds to $1056.5 per 
capita (World Health Organization, 2014c). In 2012 158 out of every 100 000 in Brazil were 
infected with malaria. This is slightly above the regional average (WHO’s Americas region) 
of 139, but below the global average. Most of the malaria cases in Brazil were reported from 
the regions of the Amazonas, making it a regional problem. Prevalence of tuberculosis (59 out 
of every 100 000) is also slightly above the regional average of 40 per 100 000 (World Health 
Organization, 2014g). An estimated 730 000 people with AIDS live in Brazil, out of which 
only about 190 100 are being treated with ARV-drugs. A national STI (Sexually transmitted 
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infection)-program for AIDS was established in 1996. This program guaranteed free treatment 
to HIV/AIDS-patients funded by the government through the Brazilian Ministry of Health, 
and has been reported to have decreased the mortality of AIDS patients by about half (Emilio, 
2011). 
Brazil has been brought forward as a model example among countries that deal with AIDS 
and in their dealing of other diseases that are preventable through vaccination. However, in 
other areas, such as in dealing with the problems of Dengue fever, Brazil has had very little 
success in its control efforts. Nevertheless, the improvements made in public health can be 
seen through a 20 percent decline in deaths from non-communicable diseases between 1996 
and 2007. The decline stems mainly from a decrease in number of deaths from chronic 
respiratory diseases (such as asthma) accompanied by decreased smoking rates, and reduced 
cardiovascular diseases. Other non-communicable diseases such as neuropsychiatric diseases, 
diabetes and obesity have increased, that are often more ascribed to increased welfare and 
developed countries. It is important to note that Brazil, as one of the countries with the largest 
income inequalities of the world, also suffers from social, ethnic and geographical differences 
in disease afflictions. The regions of the southeast and south are wealthier than the regions 
north and northeast (Victora, et. al., 2011). 
Brazil has a history as a military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, and upon the return to 
democracy there was a strong social movement promoting a reformed health sector. This led 
to a Unified Health System (SUS) being introduced into the new 1988 constitution. A 
comprehensive universal health insurance was introduced and funded by taxes and social 
contributions (like social security payments). This system has been in place and providing the 
Brazilian population with free health care on primary, secondary and tertiary levels since 
1989 (Victora, et. al., 2011). 
5.4.2 Brazilian patent law prior to TRIPS 
Brazil has a long patent history and introduced its first patent law in 1890, earlier than many 
other developing countries of the world. However, this law did not involve pharmaceutical 
patents. This meant that Brazil, like India, was given a transition period until 2005 before it 
had to implement the TRIPS-agreement (Flanagan and Whiteman, 2006). Unlike India, Brazil 
made the highly criticized decision not to exercise this right after considerable trade pressures, 
including a proposed 100 percent tariff on all Brazilian exports from the US. Therefore Brazil 
introduced a new patent law in 1996 that was in accordance with TRIPS, despite its heavy 
protesting against TRIPS. This can be seen in stand taken by the Brazilian government that 
public health should not have to be “subordinate to abuses of economic power” at a 
conference arranged by the WHO and UN on AIDS in June 2000. Brazil did however exercise 
its right to include a robust compulsory licensing plan, meaning for instance that in case a 
patent holder fails to use the patent for manufacturing or exploitation within three years’ time 
of the patent’s issuing the government has the possibility to issue a nonexclusive compulsory 
license (Viana, 2002, p.311).  
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5.4.3 Prices 
Brazil lost almost all its production capacity of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients as a 
consequence of the compliance with TRIPS, meaning a great increase in imports and price of 
pharmaceutical products. As an integral part of Brazil’s applauded universal public access 
policy to support all citizens with ARV-medicines Brazil relied on its system of public 
manufacturing facilities to provide affordable ARV-drugs. As a consequence of TRIPS and 
increased resistance in patients against treatment with first-line ARV-drugs a need for new 
second-line ARV-drugs arose. However, second-line and other important ARV-drugs were 
patented by MNCs and couldn’t be produced in Brazil without infringing on those patents. 
This meant a new cost of medicines which by far surpassed the original cost of domestic 
production, or imports, of generic ARV-drugs, and subsequently meant a strain on the public 
health expenditure budget. This led the Brazilian government to make use of its possibility to 
threaten pharmaceutical companies with the issuing of compulsory licenses (Abbott and 
Reichman, 2007). 
In 2007 Brazil issued compulsory licenses for ARV- medicines, such as for the patented 
products Kaletra (“Lopinavir”) held by Abbott and Merck’s Efavirenz to be produced by a 
Brazilian manufacturer. Efavirenz is an ARV-treatment used in treating 75 000 of Brazil’s 
200 000 patients. Merck had made an offer to willingly lower its price of Efavirenz from $580 
to $400 dollars per patient; however this was still significantly more expensive than importing 
a generic version from India at a cost of $165 dollars per patient and year. Further the 
companies holding the patents in question were asked to transfer their technology to domestic 
Brazilian producers so as to enable domestic production, but all refused. After threats from 
the Brazilian minister of health of breaking patents the pharmaceutical companies eventually 
caved. This meant for instance that Abbott agreed to lower the price of Kaletra by 46 percent 
and provide it free of charge to parts of the AIDS-infected in Brazil (163 000 out of 600 000 
carriers of the virus). The compromise meant that the price of Kaletra sunk from $1.17 to 63 
cents per pill and Abbott got to keep its patent for Kaletra. This made the Brazilian policy to 
supply HIV medicines free of charge to those in need more affordable for the government. It 
was also estimated that the issuing of a compulsory license on Efavirenz saved the Brazilian 
government an approximate $30 million per year. However, worries were voiced that the 
negotiation tactics may be damaging for Brazil’s reputation among pharmaceutical companies 
and led to a decreased will to launch products in the future (Emilio, 2011). 
5.4.4 Availability 
The same econometric analysis described in the section in India using product sales data from 
market research firms such as IMS Health Inc. to investigate the availability of new medicines 
in countries around the world was conducted for Brazil. The study found that new medicines 
were less likely to be found in developing countries with historically weak IPR, such as Brazil 
and India, than in developed countries with more secure IPR, such as Germany, even after the 
implementation of TRIPS. By using Spain as a base country the group of investigated 
essential medicines was only 23 percent as likely to be patented and sold in Brazil as in Spain, 
despite its TRIPS compliance. In contrast the average medicine was 60 percent more likely to 
be available in Germany, which indicates that Spain is not the country with highest 
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availability either. In Brazil it was a significantly more likely that the average patented 
medicine would have zero sellers, fewer than two-thirds of the essential drugs included in the 
sample were sold in Brazil, which means a great loss in available cutting-edge medical 
products offered to consumers in Brazil, implying that there might be a welfare loss (Berndt, 
et. al., 2011).  
5.4.5 Competition 
The Brazilian pharmaceutical industry predominately caters for the domestic market, in 
contrast to the Indian pharmaceutical industry which has a large share of exports and a 
positive trade balance in pharmaceutical products. No Brazilian firms have taken steps to 
conducting R&D and increasing their own innovation, but have rather stayed focused on the 
generic segment. Brazilian pharmaceutical markets hold 80 percent of the domestic market 
share of generic medicines. In the post-TRIPS period this has resulted in a large trade deficit 
in medicines of nearly three billion dollars (Schüren, 2013). 
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6. Findings 
6.1 Medicine prices 
After the implementation of TRIPS there is clear evidence of growing financial pressure from 
high medicine prices on the health budget of governments in developing countries. This is not 
in the least illustrated in the issuing of compulsory licenses in Thailand and the threat of 
issuing compulsory licenses in Brazil (Abbott and Reichman, 2007). Although compulsory 
licenses have been proposed as a possible solution to the problem of high medicine prices in 
times of acute need, compulsory licenses haven’t lived up to those expectations in practice, as 
was illustrated in the Thai issuing of compulsory licenses for ARV-medicines. The right to do 
so is clearly stated in the TRIPS agreement, but nevertheless it held negative consequences for 
Thailand as seen in the withholding of new medicines by the affected pharmaceutical 
company. (Jain, 2013) When discussing ARV-medicines it is also important to take note that 
different diseases carry different costs. While malaria and tuberculosis are curable, HIV is 
not. Tuberculosis requires frequent medical attention for about 6-9 months (longer if the 
tuberculosis is drug resistant), but eventually the patient is expected to recover. Treatment of 
HIV/AIDS patients is lifelong, and also means frequent medical attention and expensive 
(often patented) medicines, which makes it a completely different challenge in terms of 
affordability for both patients and governments. In attempts to increase affordability this 
might mean more directed efforts depending on the disease (Cleary, et. al., 2013). 
From the studied cases of India, Thailand, South Africa and Brazil it has been found that 
TRIPS has affected prices, not in the least in the sense of prolonging (or introducing in the 
case of Thailand and India) patent term, and thereby delaying the time at which generic 
production can begin. Although pharmaceutical companies boast of their policies towards 
helping developing countries in fighting disease burdens through lowering their medicine 
prices, proof of this has been sparse. Instead the response to price negotiations has been cool, 
as seen in the cases of Brazil and Thailand, and the response to compulsory licenses has been 
lacking in understanding and approval. (Collins-Chase, 2008) If MNCs were to charge 
affordable prices for their patented medicines in developing countries, then access to essential 
medicines need not be negatively affected, however this has not been observed in the case 
studies. Although other factors may influence the price of medicines, such as high import 
tariffs, the impact of prolonged patent terms is hard to neglect. Thereby it can be said based 
on the case studies that TRIPS has increased the price levels of medicines in India, Thailand, 
South Africa and Brazil, in spite of active efforts from the studied countries to minimize the 
damage done to their health budgets by negotiation, issuing compulsory licenses and carefully 
phrased laws. (Klug, 2012) 
6.2 Availability of medicines 
Although it was shown above that prices of medicines have increased, this need not mean that 
the overall availability of medicines has decreased. In theory the stricter patent laws can be 
attributed to have led to more patent applications of new medicines, which can perhaps 
compensate for the increased price levels. However this has been disproved in a study 
conducted by Berndt on medicine availability in countries with a history of weak patent laws 
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on pharmaceutical products. An econometric analysis using product sales data from market 
research firms such as IMS Health Inc. to investigate the availability of new medicines in 
countries around the world found that new medicines were less likely to be found in 
developing countries with historically weak IPR, such as Brazil and India, than in developed 
countries with more secure IPR, such as Germany, even after the implementation of TRIPS. 
This was exemplified in the two case studies by numbers illustrating the difference in 
availability using Spain as a base country. This would indicate that old habits die hard, and 
that the introduction of TRIPS might not have brought the effect of having increased the will 
of pharmaceutical companies to patent drugs in developing countries yet. (Berndt, et. al., 
2011) 
Since the two factors influencing the anticipated profits on a new drug: market size and patent 
protection, the small loopholes created by the Indian government after implementing TRIPS 
may partially be working against it. Although the Indian market is large, thereby increasing 
the probability of a drug being launched, its patent protection is still weaker than many other 
countries with TRIPS. Therefore pharmaceutical companies may still hesitate in deciding to 
file for patents and launching their new drugs in India. Patent protection is primarily relevant 
to the first entrant to a market, the innovator (or licensee) since it shelters from competition 
thereby increasing their incentive to introduce the new product on the market. When the fixed 
costs of entry (product testing) are smaller than the profits anticipated, then new firms will 
enter the market (Berndt, et. al., 2011). 
There are also other factors than increased price that can be found contributing to poor 
medicine availability. This was shown in the case of South Africa, where Barnes (2003) has 
pointed to the poor infrastructure and its negative impact of medicine availability. Poor 
education of human capital, few doctors in rural areas, low ability to properly store and 
distribute medicines are all factors which contribute to the poor availability of medicines in 
South Africa. This does not mean that the high prices of patented medicines are unimportant, 
but it does mean that an over focus on medicine prices as a determinant of availability might 
be dangerous, since low prices alone aren’t sufficient in solving for problems of availability. 
Therefore the findings on availability of medicines after TRIPS are somewhat mixed, but for 
the cases of India, Thailand and Brazil there are clear indicators that the availability of 
medicines has decreased. Both econometric studies indicate that old lax patent laws still have 
an impact as shown in studies of India and Brazil, and from the retaliation of pharmaceutical 
companies after the issuing of compulsory licenses as was shown in the case of Thailand. 
Thereby the overall effect on availability of medicines after TRIPS can be seen as largely 
negative, but perhaps not the sole determinant of availability as illustrated in South Africa. 
Economists such as Barnes have pointed to the poor infrastructure in many developing 
countries, such as South Africa, that complicate the distribution of medicines in rural areas. 
This is a relevant remark for many developing countries and a matter which should be 
addressed, but for some reasons patents, IPR and monopolies are that which has attracted the 
most attention of NGOs and other critics (Barnes, 2003). 
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6.3 Public health 
The generic production of ARV-drugs in Brazil under its policy to distribute ARV-drugs free 
of charge to all its citizens infected with AIDS was initiated in 1997. The result of this policy 
was enough to break the development of the disease as theorized by health experts. Instead of 
1.2 million being infected by 1999 as was estimated in 1979, the development had by then 
been halted and returned to the level of infected on 1995. However, the policy has been costly 
to the Brazilian government, and might have been difficult to accomplish had Brazil not had 
the capacity to initiate large scale production of generic medicines itself. (International 
Intellectual Property Institute, 2000) This, and other similar policies introduced in the other 
studied countries, was complicated by the introduction of TRIPS due to the limitations it set 
on generic manufacturing among other things. Brazil struggled in being able to afford the 
second-line ARV-drugs it needed, and faced great opposition when trying to use its 
prerogative to issue compulsory licenses. (Emilio, 2011) Brazil eventually managed to 
negotiate price reductions, but in the cases of Thailand and South Africa solutions didn’t 
come as easily. Thailand eventually had to issue a compulsory license, and South Africa faced 
a prolonged law suit during which time many HIV patients had time to die. (Kongolo, 2001) 
Thereby it can be said that though TRIPS includes some flexibilities to protect public health, 
these flexibilities appear difficult to implement in practice. Thereby the externalities that arise 
from the monopoly rights defined in TRIPS cannot be seen as minimized according to the 
Coase theorem. Perhaps this might be due to unequal bargaining power among developed and 
developing countries, but in either way it appears that the created externalities are large. 
Thereby the overall effect of TRIPS on public health appears negative, in opposition to some 
of the economic theory studied. (Harris, 1990)  
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7. Conclusion 
Based on evidence found in theories, models and the studied case studies it has become clear 
that the issue of medical patents has raised a lot of emotions and given reason to much heated 
discussions and debates as to what the ramifications of such legislative action might be. The 
case studies give support for the warnings heeded by critics, since they indicate that prices 
have gone up and access to essential medicines has decreased. This is supported by instances 
such as the choice of pharmaceutical companies not to register new medicines in Thailand as 
a punishment for its enforcement of compulsory licences in the past. This would indicate that 
the words of warning regarding stricter regulations for medical patents should be taken 
seriously, since there is a possibility that the consequences of such acting may indeed be 
severe. However, it should also be kept in mind that the TRIPS-agreement is a fairly young 
agreement and that its long term effects have yet to be revealed.  
Many of the economists cited, such as Stiglitz (2008), have stated that there is a fine line 
between too much and too little intellectual property protection, and that the same degree of 
protection might not be optimal to all countries. Since tens of millions of people die yearly 
from diseases that are treatable by existing cures, out of inability to afford them, this line 
appears not to have been found. (Bird, 2009) One possible solution to the problem of 
expensive medicines as proposed by Khor is that TRIPS could be amended to exempt 
essential medicines listed from patentability. (Khor, 2002) As TRIPS is still a relatively new 
agreement it is yet to see how its effects unfold and what they might be in a long term 
perspective.  
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